Mozambique

AfricaEastern AfricaCritical Risk

Composite Index

72

Risk Indicators
72Critical

Active clusters

41

Related intel

8

Key Facts

Capital

Maputo

Population

32.2M

Related Intelligence

92economy

Emerging-Market Sovereign and Corporate Debt Reopens: Argentina Funds Energy Expansion as Poland Issues Dollar Bonds and Mozambique Signals Restructuring

McEwen Copper is reportedly in talks with global lenders to finance its $4 billion Los Azules project in Argentina, aiming to move one of the country’s largest undeveloped copper deposits toward production. In parallel, Bloomberg notes that Argentina’s corporate borrowers are increasingly looking to global debt markets to fund an energy-driven expansion rather than merely repairing balance sheets after years of crisis. Separately, Mozambique’s dollar bonds slid to their weakest level in nearly three years after authorities signaled the strongest yet intent to pursue restructuring talks with creditors. Poland, meanwhile, returned to international bond markets with a three-tranche, dollar-denominated sovereign offering, marking a continued normalization of access for some emerging issuers after the start of the Iran war. Strategically, the cluster points to a bifurcation in emerging-market financing conditions: some countries and corporates are using external capital to accelerate growth, while others are approaching restructuring as market access deteriorates. Argentina’s push to fund energy and mining investment through global debt suggests an attempt to attract foreign capital and lock in project pipelines, which can shift bargaining power toward investors if execution risk is contained. Mozambique’s bond weakness and restructuring signaling indicate creditor coordination is becoming more urgent, raising the risk of protracted negotiations and potential spillovers into regional risk premia. Poland’s issuance after the Iran-war onset underscores that geopolitical shocks do not uniformly tighten financing; instead, investor selectivity is increasing based on perceived policy credibility, liquidity, and external balances. Market and economic implications are most visible in sovereign and credit spreads, with dollar-denominated instruments likely reacting to changes in perceived default risk and restructuring probabilities. Argentina-linked credit and mining project financing narratives can support demand for higher-yield EM paper, but they also raise sensitivity to USD funding costs, FX volatility, and commodity-price assumptions for copper and energy. Mozambique’s move toward restructuring is typically associated with widening distressed spreads and reduced recovery expectations, which can spill into broader sub-Saharan Africa credit indices and ETF flows. Poland’s three-tranche dollar issuance can be read as a positive liquidity signal for European EM credit, potentially tightening spreads at the margin for similarly rated issuers, while also increasing supply that may temporarily pressure secondary-market prices. What to watch next is the concrete outcome of lender talks for Los Azules, including terms, covenants, and whether financing is structured as project finance, corporate debt, or blended facilities. For Argentina, monitor issuance calendars, investor appetite for energy-linked corporate paper, and any policy signals that affect FX stability and inflation expectations, since these drive the cost of USD funding. For Mozambique, the key trigger is whether authorities formally initiate restructuring talks and how creditors respond, including whether an agreement framework is proposed and timelines for negotiations. For Poland, watch follow-on demand indicators such as book size, yield levels versus peers, and any subsequent guidance on future issuance, as these will clarify how durable market access is in a post-Iran-war risk environment.

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72security

Xenophobia Evacuations Ignite a Regional Flashpoint as Nigeria Scrambles Aid and South Africa Faces Escalating Violence

Nigerian authorities and partners are responding to a wave of xenophobia-driven evacuations from South Africa, while Nigeria simultaneously investigates a separate aviation incident that could affect regional mobility and confidence. On June 11, Premium Times reported that the Imo State Government announced support for returnees, including cash and airtime via MTN, alongside a promise of N1m for “indigenes,” as the first batch of 258 Nigerians arrived back from South Africa. The same reporting ties the response to logistics at Murtala Muhammed International Airport and the involvement of Air Peace, indicating a coordinated government–telecom–carrier effort to stabilize reintegration. Separately, Premium Times also noted that the Nigerian Safety Investigation Bureau (NSIB) began a probe after recovery of flight recorders from an Asaba roadway landing, with the flight recorder recovery described as a major step in determining what happened on the Lagos-to-Asaba route. Strategically, the cluster highlights how domestic social tensions in South Africa can rapidly become a cross-border political and humanitarian issue for Nigeria, with spillover risks for migration governance across Southern Africa. The France 24 report describes xenophobic violence escalating in South Africa, including attacks in Mossel Bay where two Mozambicans were killed and dozens of homes were torched, with displaced people forced to sleep outside a police station. This dynamic benefits no one in the long run: it undermines South Africa’s internal security posture, strains its Department of Home Affairs capacity, and forces neighboring states to spend political capital and fiscal resources on emergency repatriation and reintegration. For Nigeria, the evacuations and public recounting of traumatic experiences by returnees underscore reputational stakes—both for diaspora protection and for the credibility of state-led assistance—while also creating pressure for tighter migration policy coordination with South Africa. Market and economic implications are likely to concentrate in travel, telecom airtime/cash distribution channels, and risk premia for regional mobility rather than in broad commodity flows. The immediate operational focus for Nigeria is on airlines and airport throughput—Air Peace and Murtala Muhammed International Airport—while MTN’s role in distributing airtime and cash signals a short-term demand for distribution rails and customer support capacity. In South Africa, the escalation of violence and displacement can raise local security costs and disrupt informal settlement economies, which can feed into short-term volatility in consumer spending and local service demand. While the aviation probe is not yet tied to a systemic safety finding, any deterioration in confidence around flight operations can affect passenger volumes and insurance pricing for regional routes, with knock-on effects for aviation-related equities and hedging instruments. What to watch next is whether South Africa’s security and migration institutions can contain the violence and prevent further mass displacement, and whether Nigeria’s returnee support scales beyond the first 258 arrivals. Key indicators include police protection effectiveness for displaced groups (e.g., whether camps outside police stations remain necessary), the pace of additional evacuations, and public statements or policy actions by South Africa’s Department of Home Affairs. On the aviation side, the NSIB’s next milestones—analysis of recovered flight recorders and any preliminary safety findings—will determine whether the Asaba incident becomes a confidence shock for regional air travel. Trigger points for escalation include renewed attacks in additional provinces or cities, evidence of coordinated ethnic targeting, and any delays or funding gaps in reintegration assistance; de-escalation would be signaled by reduced violence incidents, improved shelter conditions, and a stable schedule for returnee processing.

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72security

Mozambique mourns anti-immigrant killings as South Africa repatriates bodies—while Pakistan battles hostage terror

Mozambique’s government says nine Mozambican nationals were killed in South Africa during anti-immigrant attacks, and diplomatic efforts are now focused on returning the bodies. The report also states that more than 700 nationals have already been repatriated, signaling a rapid, government-led response to a widening security and social backlash. On the South Africa side, the government is portrayed as coordinating with Mozambique to manage identification, transport, and next steps for affected families. The episode underscores how quickly migrant-related tensions can translate into lethal violence and cross-border political friction. Strategically, the cluster links two different fault lines: migrant insecurity in Southern Africa and militant violence in Pakistan’s northwest. In South Africa, anti-immigrant attacks can strain bilateral relations, complicate regional migration governance, and raise the domestic political cost of enforcement and integration policies. In Pakistan, the reports describe clashes involving paramilitary and Frontier Constabulary personnel, including an attempted capture of a post in Peshawar’s Hassan Khel area and a separate incident in NW Pakistan where paramilitary troops were killed and three taken hostage. Together, they suggest that security services face simultaneous pressures—protecting border-adjacent communities and preventing militant operations from escalating into hostage crises. The immediate beneficiaries of instability are militant networks and opportunistic actors who exploit social grievances, while governments bear the reputational and operational costs of protecting civilians and critical security infrastructure. Market and economic implications are likely indirect but still material. In Southern Africa, spikes in migrant violence can elevate insurance and security premia for cross-border logistics and increase the risk of localized labor disruptions in sectors reliant on migrant workforces, including informal services and agriculture. In Pakistan, attacks on paramilitary and constabulary units can raise near-term risk sentiment around security-sensitive regions, potentially affecting transport, retail, and energy-adjacent supply routes through higher operational costs and tighter movement controls. While the articles do not name specific commodities or financial instruments, the direction of risk is toward higher volatility in regional risk premia and potentially higher costs for security contractors and logistics providers. If hostage situations persist or retaliatory cycles broaden, the probability of broader disruptions increases, which typically feeds into FX and sovereign risk perceptions for the affected country. What to watch next is whether Mozambique and South Africa move from repatriation to longer-term policy coordination on migrant protection and enforcement against perpetrators. For Pakistan, the key trigger is the status of the three hostages referenced in the NW Pakistan incident and whether the attempted capture of the Frontier Constabulary post leads to sustained follow-on attacks. Monitoring indicators include official casualty figures, the pace of body repatriations, announcements of arrests or prosecutions in South Africa, and Pakistan’s subsequent operational tempo in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Escalation would be signaled by additional attacks on security posts, expanded militant claims of responsibility, or evidence of coordinated attacks across districts. De-escalation would look like rapid hostage resolution, arrests, and a reduction in attempted post-capture incidents over the coming days.

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72security

Evacuations Spiral: Ghana and Nigeria Pull Citizens From South Africa as Xenophobia and U.S. Health Cuts Bite

Ghana has evacuated about 1,000 citizens from South Africa amid rising xenophobic attacks, with President John Dramani Mahama and senior officials framing the operation as fulfilling a promise to protect nationals abroad. The reporting indicates Ghanaian authorities moved quickly as violence against migrants intensified in South Africa, the continent’s largest economy. In parallel, Nigeria is preparing a broader repatriation effort, planning five repatriation flights from South Africa this week after anti-immigrant attacks and protests. Separately, Malawi is also repatriating citizens from South Africa, underscoring that the crisis is regional rather than isolated to one nationality. The strategic context is a convergence of internal security breakdown and external policy pressure across Southern Africa. Xenophobic violence is not only a humanitarian and law-and-order issue; it can reshape migration politics, strain bilateral relations, and force governments to spend political capital on consular protection and emergency logistics. Nigeria and Ghana—both major regional actors—are effectively signaling that they will not tolerate perceived host-state failure, which can increase diplomatic friction with Pretoria while also hardening domestic narratives about migration. At the same time, U.S. funding uncertainty around PEPFAR—reported as cancellation or redirection under the Trump administration—adds a second shock: health systems already stressed by displacement and insecurity may face further strain, raising the risk of secondary crises among vulnerable populations in South Africa and Mozambique. The combined effect is that both security and social-service capacity are being tested simultaneously, creating conditions for escalation if violence spreads or if host-country protection is viewed as inadequate. Market and economic implications are likely to show up through risk premia in regional travel, insurance, and logistics, alongside potential disruptions to labor supply in sectors that rely on migrant workers. While the articles do not quantify financial losses, the direction is clear: heightened repatriation activity typically increases short-term costs for airlines, freight, and border services, and can depress consumer and business confidence in affected areas. Health funding uncertainty tied to PEPFAR can influence demand and procurement for medical commodities and HIV-related diagnostics and therapies, with knock-on effects for pharmaceutical distribution networks in South Africa and Mozambique. Currency and rates impacts are harder to pin to the news alone, but emergency capital outflows and heightened risk perception can pressure local FX and raise hedging costs for regional investors. In the near term, the most visible “market symbols” are likely to be regional airline and insurance risk pricing rather than a single commodity move, though health-sector supply chains could face localized shortages. What to watch next is whether South Africa’s authorities can contain violence and restore credible protection for migrants, which would determine whether repatriation slows or expands. Key indicators include the number of additional flights announced by Nigeria and other countries, the geographic spread of attacks reported by local monitors, and any official statements on policing, detention, and prosecution of perpetrators. For the health dimension, the trigger point is clarity on PEPFAR funding status—whether cancellations are reversed, redirected with safeguards, or implemented with mitigation plans for clinics serving high-burden communities. A further escalation would be signaled by renewed large-scale protests, attacks on aid workers or clinics, or evidence that displaced populations are unable to access treatment. De-escalation would likely follow if violence declines, consular operations stabilize, and health providers receive funding continuity assurances within weeks rather than months.

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72economy

Africa and Latin America face a new “resource security” test as illegal mining, gangs, and state control collide

In Nigeria’s Benue State, local communities confronted miners over alleged illegal activities, signaling a direct breakdown in the social license that underpins extractive operations. The report frames the confrontation as community-led enforcement rather than a routine regulatory dispute, implying that formal oversight is failing to contain illicit production. In Venezuela, a separate investigation describes “blood gold,” alleging that nearly all mining activity is controlled by gangs or by guerrillas operating from neighboring Colombia. The article’s core claim is that armed actors have effectively replaced state capacity in the mining value chain, turning extraction into a security and governance problem. Together, the two stories show how illegal or quasi-legal mining can become a parallel economy with political leverage. Strategically, these developments matter because mineral supply chains increasingly intersect with organized crime, cross-border armed groups, and state attempts to reassert control. Venezuela’s alleged Colombia-linked guerrilla involvement highlights the regional spillover risk of illicit mining networks, where profits can fund violence and undermine border governance. Nigeria’s Benue confrontation suggests that communities may be willing to escalate outside official channels when they perceive environmental harm, labor exploitation, or revenue capture by unauthorized operators. Mozambique’s policy move—tightening mining control through a rule requiring a 15% state stake and pushing for local processing—shows a contrasting approach: using regulation to capture value domestically and reduce leakage. The net effect is a widening “resource security” gap: where states cannot police sites, armed groups and criminal networks fill the void, but where states can legislate and enforce, they may attract investment while also raising compliance and political risk. Market and economic implications are likely to be most visible in precious metals supply expectations, regional security premia, and the cost of compliance for miners. If Venezuela’s gold output is effectively governed by gangs, investors may discount the traceability and ESG quality of supply, potentially affecting downstream refiners and bullion-linked instruments through higher risk haircuts rather than immediate price moves. In Mozambique, the 15% state stake rule and local processing requirement can shift project economics, influencing equity valuations of mining operators and increasing demand for local infrastructure and services, which may raise capex and timeline risk. Nigeria’s Benue unrest can disrupt small-scale production and logistics, feeding into localized supply volatility and higher insurance or security costs for contractors. While these are not single-country macro shocks, they can contribute to incremental tightening in “clean” gold sourcing and raise regional risk premiums for mining-related equities and credit. Next, watch for enforcement signals that indicate whether governments can convert policy into on-the-ground control. For Venezuela, key triggers include evidence of sustained interdictions, changes in armed-group behavior near mining corridors, and any diplomatic or security coordination with Colombia targeting illicit finance flows. For Nigeria’s Benue, the escalation path depends on whether authorities prosecute illegal miners, establish credible community grievance mechanisms, and prevent retaliatory cycles after confrontations. For Mozambique, investors will focus on implementing regulations, licensing timelines, and whether local processing capacity is actually built fast enough to meet requirements without stalling production. In the near term, the most important indicators are arrests or seizures tied to illegal mining, changes in state stake enforcement, and measurable improvements in traceability systems for gold and other minerals.

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72security

From Plateau ambushes to drone strikes and gang trials: why 2026’s violence wave is reshaping regional risk

Gunmen killed eight people and injured 10 others in an attack on Gwon-Ajang village in Barkin Ladi Local Government Area of Nigeria’s Plateau State, according to Premium Times Nigeria. The incident adds to a pattern of lethal violence in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, where armed groups and communal tensions frequently intersect. In parallel, Russia’s Bryansk region reported four injuries after alleged Ukrainian drone strikes, with acting governor Yegor Kovalchuk saying medical assistance was provided. Separately, in India’s Assam, an AASU leader was killed and the leader’s sister injured in a machete attack, while Assam Police later gunned down the assailant. Across these cases, the common thread is not just battlefield violence but political and security signaling—who can strike, where, and with what apparent impunity. In Nigeria’s Plateau, attacks on rural communities can intensify local cycles of retaliation and complicate state capacity, benefiting armed actors that thrive on governance gaps. In Bryansk, drone strikes highlight the ongoing cross-border security contest and raise the stakes for air-defense readiness and civilian risk management, with potential knock-on effects for insurance and logistics. In Mozambique, reporting on “death squads” targeting opposition suggests a contested narrative of politically motivated assassinations, where the government frames incidents as isolated while opponents and civil society argue a systematic pattern. In South Africa, Nigeria’s police warning about reprisal attacks against South Africans underscores how migrant-related tensions can rapidly become transnational security problems. Market and economic implications are most immediate where violence threatens supply chains, labor mobility, and risk premia. Nigeria’s Plateau violence can disrupt local agriculture and transport corridors, raising security costs for logistics and potentially feeding into regional food-price pressures, especially in a country already sensitive to inflation expectations. Drone-related incidents in Bryansk can affect regional industrial operations and insurance pricing for assets exposed to air-defense gaps, even if the reported damage is limited to injuries. In Mozambique, credible claims of politically motivated killings can deter investment in extractives and infrastructure by increasing country-risk and governance discount rates. In El Salvador, reporting on Bukele’s “expéditive” justice against gangs—paired with opaque collective trials—can influence investor sentiment around rule-of-law and due-process risk, which can matter for banking, foreign direct investment, and compliance costs. What to watch next is whether these incidents remain isolated or evolve into sustained campaigns that force policy responses. For Nigeria’s Plateau, monitor follow-on attacks, arrests, and any security-operation escalation by state and federal forces, alongside community-level reprisal indicators. For Bryansk, track the frequency and target profiles of drones, any reported air-defense deployments, and whether authorities expand protective measures for critical infrastructure. For Mozambique, watch for independent verification of “death squad” claims, changes in opposition participation in public events, and any international mediation or human-rights investigations. For South Africa–Nigeria migrant tensions, the trigger point is whether anti-migrant protests translate into organized reprisals; early indicators include police statements, arrests, and the movement of South African nationals. In El Salvador, watch for legal challenges, international scrutiny, and transparency signals that could either stabilize perceptions or further raise governance risk.

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72security

South Africa’s anti-foreigner violence turns deadly—police probe killings as protests erupt in Cape Town

In Southampton, protesters clashed with police during demonstrations tied to the murder of Henry Nowak, according to reporting dated 2026-06-03. In South Africa, the violence narrative is more severe and explicitly xenophobic: on 2026-06-02, a mob killed migrants amid worsening anti-foreigner violence, with protests organized by the group “March and March” in Goodwood, a Cape Town suburb. The BBC the same day said South African police were investigating the killing of two Mozambican men, reinforcing that the unrest is not only protest-driven but also producing lethal outcomes. Together, the articles point to a fast-moving cycle of public anger, vigilante-style violence, and law-enforcement response that can quickly harden into sustained internal security pressure. Geopolitically, the core issue is internal stability with cross-border labor and migration implications. South Africa’s role as a regional magnet for workers from neighboring states like Mozambique makes xenophobic flare-ups a recurring political risk, and the involvement of organized protest activity suggests coordination beyond spontaneous street anger. The immediate beneficiaries of escalation are hardline domestic actors who can frame immigration as a security threat, while the losers are migrants, local communities hosting them, and the government’s ability to project rule-of-law credibility. If police investigations fail to deter copycat attacks, the cycle can intensify and force a more securitized posture, straining civil liberties and potentially complicating South Africa’s international standing. Even though the Southampton incident is geographically separate, it signals a broader pattern of how high-profile crimes can catalyze confrontations between crowds and police, raising the odds of political polarization. Market and economic implications are indirect but potentially meaningful for South Africa’s risk premium and for sectors sensitive to social stability. Xenophobic violence can disrupt informal and formal labor supply, elevate insurance and security costs, and worsen consumer confidence in affected metros, particularly Cape Town’s peri-urban areas like Goodwood. While the articles do not provide numeric market moves, the direction of risk is clear: heightened internal security concerns typically pressure local currency sentiment, raise short-term volatility in equities tied to domestic demand, and increase the cost of capital for logistics and retail. For investors, the most relevant instruments are South African sovereign and corporate credit spreads, the rand’s risk premium, and regional shipping/insurance pricing for routes serving South African ports. In the near term, the magnitude is likely “moderate” unless violence spreads beyond Cape Town or triggers broader disruptions to transport, commerce, or policing capacity. What to watch next is whether authorities can contain the violence and convert investigations into visible deterrence. Key indicators include the number of additional attacks reported in Cape Town and surrounding provinces, the pace of arrests and charges in the Mozambican killings, and whether “March and March” or similar groups mobilize again after the Goodwood protest. Another trigger point is any escalation from protest into sustained street clashes, which would likely prompt emergency policing measures and further inflame public sentiment. For markets, monitor rand intraday volatility around security headlines, changes in local police deployment, and any official statements on immigration enforcement that could either de-escalate or legitimize harsher crackdowns. The timeline for escalation is short—days—because copycat violence often follows closely after high-visibility incidents.

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72economy

Iran deal fog, aluminum supply shock, and fuel caps under pressure—what markets fear next

Conflicting reports around an Iran-related agreement are clouding risk sentiment, with the DAX closing in the red on May 27, 2026 as traders weigh what a deal could mean for sanctions, shipping, and energy flows. At the same time, commodity desks are turning more alarmed: London aluminum prices jumped nearly 17% since the start of the U.S.-Iran conflict, reflecting fears of smelter outages and maritime chokepoint disruptions. In parallel, Bloomberg flagged that another inflation wave may be headed from the pump to the grocery aisle, citing bad weather, tariffs, and a dwindling cattle herd as drivers of above-average food price pressure. Separately, TotalEnergies extended French fuel price caps through June, while UK petrol prices hit their highest level since 2022 after oil rebounded to around $100 per barrel following fresh U.S. strikes. Geopolitically, the cluster ties together three pressure points: Iran-diplomacy uncertainty, Middle East security escalation, and the knock-on effects on strategic commodities and consumer inflation. The immediate beneficiaries are firms and traders positioned for volatility—commodity houses and banks that can hedge supply shocks—while consumers and import-dependent manufacturers face the cost squeeze. Energy policy responses in Europe, such as TotalEnergies’ continued fuel caps, suggest governments and majors are trying to prevent political backlash from fuel-driven inflation, but they also risk distorting price signals and tightening margins. The aluminum surge underscores how quickly industrial metals markets translate security risk into real-economy supply expectations, especially when smelter availability and shipping lanes are perceived to be vulnerable. Mozambique’s dispute over LNG project delay costs adds a second-order geopolitical layer: instability and execution risk in frontier energy projects can become a fiscal and reputational issue for both host governments and Western operators. Market implications are broad and directional. Aluminum is the clearest shock asset: London prices are up nearly 17% since the onset of the U.S.-Iran conflict, implying higher input costs for transportation, construction, and packaging supply chains, and likely upward pressure on related spreads and hedging demand. Oil-linked inflation signals are intensifying: UK petrol averaged 159.43p per litre, the highest since 2022, after oil returned to roughly $100/bbl, which typically feeds into European retail fuel expectations and short-dated inflation swaps. Sugar optimism is being conditioned by El Niño impacts, while tariffs and livestock herd declines keep the risk of persistent food inflation elevated, reinforcing the “inflation persistence” narrative for central banks. In equities, even as Iran conflict hits sales, Abercrombie shares jumped 13% on an earnings beat, highlighting that sector dispersion is widening—some companies can absorb demand shocks while others cannot. For energy majors, extended fuel caps in France may stabilize consumer sentiment but can cap upside and increase working-capital needs if wholesale prices remain volatile. What to watch next is whether Iran-related negotiation signals become concrete enough to change shipping and sanctions expectations, and whether additional strikes or countermeasures keep oil near the $100/bbl zone. For metals, monitor confirmed smelter outage announcements, port/route disruptions around key maritime chokepoints, and inventory drawdown data that would validate or refute the supply-shock thesis behind the aluminum rally. For inflation, track retail fuel pass-through in the UK and France, plus weather and tariff updates that could accelerate sugar and grocery price trajectories; these will influence rate-cut timing expectations. In energy policy, the key trigger is whether France extends fuel caps beyond June or adjusts cap levels in response to wholesale moves, while in Mozambique the trigger is whether arbitration or renegotiation follows the government’s challenge to TotalEnergies’ $2 billion delay-cost estimate. Escalation risk remains elevated as long as security headlines dominate the oil curve and diplomacy remains ambiguous, but de-escalation could quickly unwind some commodity premia if credible Iran-deal milestones emerge.

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