AI Power Struggle: Can ASEAN Secure Strategic Autonomy as the US and China Race Ahead?

On 2026-08-26, SCMP framed the US–China competition over artificial intelligence as a new stage in the long-running contest for power, arguing that ASEAN must secure “strategic autonomy” rather than choosing sides by default. The piece links the digital revolution to a shift in how influence is measured, moving beyond traditional levers like territory, energy, and capital toward control of information and AI capabilities. In parallel, the NYT reported a striking attitudinal gap: people in China are described as more optimistic about AI than Americans, and the article explores what drives that difference. Together, the two narratives suggest that the AI race is not only about models and compute, but also about domestic legitimacy, adoption incentives, and perceived national benefit. Geopolitically, the core tension is that AI turns informational advantage into strategic leverage, potentially reshaping bargaining power across Southeast Asia. ASEAN’s dilemma is that AI supply chains, standards, and talent ecosystems can become de facto security dependencies, even when member states pursue economic growth rather than military alignment. The US and China benefit differently: Washington can seek interoperability, governance norms, and market access, while Beijing can leverage scale, optimism-driven adoption, and state-linked industrial capacity. The likely losers are ASEAN states that lack bargaining chips—such as regulatory credibility, procurement leverage, or the ability to diversify vendors—because they may face constrained choices in data governance, cloud services, and AI deployment. The articles therefore point to a competition over “rules of the road” and capability-building, not merely a technology trend. Market and economic implications are indirect but potentially material, especially for AI infrastructure and regional digital trade flows. If ASEAN pursues strategic autonomy, it may accelerate demand for locally governed cloud, sovereign data frameworks, and diversified AI procurement, which can shift spending toward compliance tooling, cybersecurity, and systems integration rather than single-vendor stacks. The NYT’s emphasis on differing public optimism hints at adoption velocity: faster uptake can translate into higher near-term demand for AI-enabled software, automation services, and data-center capacity, while slower adoption can delay monetization and investment cycles. Although the cluster does not provide specific price moves, the direction of risk is toward higher volatility in AI-related equities and credit tied to compute, networking, and enterprise software in the region. In FX terms, any vendor diversification and cross-border digital payments could influence trade settlement patterns, but the articles themselves do not quantify currency impacts. What to watch next is whether ASEAN governments translate “strategic autonomy” rhetoric into concrete policy instruments—such as procurement frameworks, data localization or portability rules, and standards participation. Key signals include announcements of regional AI governance bodies, public-private partnerships for compute and talent, and procurement tenders that explicitly require multi-vendor interoperability. On the US–China side, monitor export-control enforcement intensity, cloud and semiconductor supply commitments, and any moves to shape AI safety or governance norms that could become de facto compliance requirements. A practical trigger point for escalation would be sudden restrictions on cross-border AI services or cloud access that force ASEAN states to choose a dominant provider. Conversely, de-escalation would look like expanded regional technical cooperation, mutual recognition of standards, and investment announcements that broaden the vendor base without security concessions.

Geopolitical Implications

• 01

  ASEAN may face a “capability vs. dependency” trade-off as AI governance and cloud services become security-adjacent.

• 02

  US–China rivalry could shift from export controls alone toward shaping regional compliance regimes and interoperability standards.

• 03

  Public legitimacy and adoption incentives can become strategic advantages, affecting industrial scale and bargaining power.

Key Signals

• —ASEAN announcements on regional AI governance frameworks and standards participation
• —Tender language requiring multi-vendor interoperability or sovereign data governance
• —Changes in US/China export-control enforcement affecting AI chips, cloud services, or model deployment
• —Investment announcements for regional compute, talent pipelines, and AI public-private partnerships