Sudan’s Fourth-Year War Meets a Berlin Donor Clash—Will Khartoum’s Rift Block Aid?

Sudan marked three years since the civil war began in 2023, with the conflict now entering its fourth year and continuing to pit the Sudanese Armed Forces against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Multiple outlets cite staggering displacement and humanitarian collapse: roughly 14–15 million people have been forced from their homes, with about 4 million leaving Sudan entirely. NPR and other reports describe fragile signs of life in parts of Khartoum while, across the country, fighting continues to drive hunger, allegations of atrocities, and mass protection risks. On the diplomatic and funding front, Germany hosted a Berlin donor conference aiming to raise more than $1 billion for urgent projects, but Khartoum’s government publicly denounced the meeting as “surprising and unacceptable,” saying it was organized without consulting it and meddles in internal affairs. Geopolitically, the timing of Berlin’s fundraising push highlights how Sudan’s war is increasingly shaped by external regional competition, even as global attention is diverted to other crises. The ISPI analysis referenced in the cluster frames the Middle East’s reshaping of Sudan’s war as a contest of influence, implying that outside backers and shifting alignments can prolong fragmentation and reduce incentives for compromise. The Berlin conference’s decision to exclude the two main belligerents—explicitly including both the army and the RSF—creates a governance and legitimacy dilemma: donors want access and leverage, while Khartoum wants consultation and recognition. In this context, the immediate beneficiaries are humanitarian implementers and displaced populations, but the losers are diplomatic trust, aid predictability, and any prospect of coordinated pressure on both sides to reduce violence. Market and economic implications are indirect but real, especially for regional stability and risk pricing. Kenya’s role as a receiving country for some Sudanese refugees points to potential pressure on urban services and local labor markets in Nairobi, which can spill into food and transport costs if flows accelerate. Humanitarian funding gaps also matter for commodity-linked supply chains: food insecurity is repeatedly cited as deepening, with nearly 29 million facing acute hunger in one report and over 33 million needing humanitarian aid in another. While the articles do not name specific tickers, the likely financial transmission runs through sovereign and NGO funding risk premia, insurance and shipping costs for relief movements, and broader EM risk sentiment tied to conflict-driven displacement. In the near term, the most sensitive “instrument” is aid financing itself—if Khartoum’s rejection hardens, disbursement timelines and delivery routes can slip, increasing the probability of further price spikes in already-stressed humanitarian markets. What to watch next is whether Berlin and other donors can convert fundraising into operational access without further politicizing aid. Key indicators include whether Khartoum reverses or escalates its stance toward the conference, whether humanitarian agencies report improved corridors or continued obstruction, and whether violence patterns shift in and around Khartoum and major displacement hubs. Trigger points for escalation would be renewed public refusals of engagement by either belligerent, credible allegations of intensified atrocities, or evidence that aid deliveries are being curtailed. De-escalation signals would include any movement toward consultation mechanisms, increased humanitarian access commitments, and measurable reductions in acute hunger indicators. The timeline is tight: the conference is already underway in April 2026, but the real test will be disbursement milestones and delivery metrics over the coming weeks and months as the fourth-year war grinds on.

Geopolitical Implications

• 01

  Aid diplomacy is becoming a proxy arena for legitimacy between Khartoum and international donors, potentially affecting access and delivery routes.

• 02

  Regional backers and Middle East influence dynamics may be sustaining fragmentation, reducing prospects for negotiated settlement.

• 03

  Excluding belligerents from donor forums may improve humanitarian focus but can also limit leverage and coordination with parties controlling territory and corridors.

• 04

  Refugee absorption by Kenya can become a political and economic pressure point, influencing regional stability and future policy toward Sudan.

Key Signals

• —Any formal response from Khartoum to Berlin’s follow-up consultations or access frameworks
• —Humanitarian agency reports on corridor openings/closures and delivery delays in April–May 2026
• —Shifts in fighting intensity around Khartoum and major displacement hubs
• —Public statements by RSF and the army regarding participation, access, or ceasefire proposals
• —Refugee flow metrics into Nairobi and changes in local food and service costs