Is Washington quietly preparing Greenland’s next power play—while Ukraine peace talks stall?

A former CIA officer, Larry Johnson, argues that the United States has leverage over Kyiv to push Ukraine toward peace, but has not shown the will to use it. The claim, carried by TASS on 2026-09-22, frames US policy as a deliberate choice rather than a constraint, implying that negotiation outcomes remain partly controllable from Washington. In parallel, multiple outlets are spotlighting renewed attention on Greenland as a strategic frontier for US ambitions in the Arctic. ABC (2026-09-22) points to the idea that the US wants army bases in Greenland, recalling earlier attempts that left behind abandoned radar stations and nuclear waste. Taken together, the cluster suggests a broader pattern: Washington’s willingness to shape outcomes may be selective, prioritizing strategic positioning in the Arctic while keeping Ukraine’s endgame uncertain. Strategically, the Ukraine angle is about bargaining power and signaling—who sets the tempo of negotiations and what concessions are demanded. If Johnson is right, the US can influence Kyiv’s negotiating posture, but the absence of pressure implies either a preference for continued leverage, domestic or alliance constraints, or a belief that time favors Washington’s preferred end-state. The Greenland reporting shifts the lens to long-horizon competition, where radar infrastructure, military basing, and legacy environmental liabilities become part of the geopolitical calculus. The US–Greenland–Denmark triangle matters because basing access and infrastructure upgrades require political consent and can trigger diplomatic friction with Denmark and broader Arctic stakeholders. In this reading, the “peace” narrative for Ukraine and the “posture” narrative for Greenland may be two sides of the same strategic approach: manage risk in one theater while expanding options in another. Market and economic implications are indirect but potentially material. Arctic basing and radar upgrades tend to support defense and aerospace supply chains, which can lift sentiment around US defense contractors and Arctic-capable surveillance technologies, while also increasing scrutiny of environmental remediation costs tied to legacy nuclear waste. For energy and shipping markets, even talk of Arctic military infrastructure can affect risk premia for routes and insurance pricing, especially for northern transits that rely on stable governance and predictable security conditions. On the Ukraine side, the notion that Washington could push peace but chooses not to can keep uncertainty elevated for European security spending and for hedging demand in defense-related procurement cycles. Currency and rates impacts are not explicitly cited in the articles, but persistent geopolitical uncertainty typically reinforces safe-haven flows and can keep volatility elevated in European risk assets. Overall, the cluster points to a “policy uncertainty premium” rather than a single commodity shock. What to watch next is whether US messaging on Ukraine shifts from leverage rhetoric to concrete negotiation steps, such as explicit proposals, timelines, or conditionality tied to ceasefire or territorial frameworks. In the Greenland track, the key trigger is whether discussions move from media narratives to formal requests for basing access, infrastructure permitting, or defense cooperation agreements involving Denmark and Greenland authorities. Environmental and legal follow-through on abandoned radar sites and nuclear waste is another escalation/de-escalation lever, because remediation commitments can either reduce friction or become a bargaining chip. For markets, the practical indicators are defense procurement announcements, Arctic surveillance contract awards, and any changes in shipping insurance guidance for northern routes. The timeline is near-term for diplomatic signaling around Ukraine and medium-term for any tangible basing or infrastructure decisions in Greenland, with escalation risk rising if environmental liabilities are politicized or if basing access becomes a public dispute.

Geopolitical Implications

• 01

  If Washington can pressure Kyiv but chooses not to, negotiation leverage may be used to shape end-state conditions rather than to end the war quickly.

• 02

  Arctic basing discussions can reconfigure deterrence and surveillance dynamics, increasing the strategic value of Greenland for US posture.

• 03

  Environmental liabilities (abandoned radar stations and nuclear waste) can turn infrastructure cooperation into a bargaining and reputational battleground.

• 04

  Denmark’s governance role over Greenland raises the risk of intra-alliance friction if US moves are perceived as unilateral.

Key Signals

• —Any US statements that translate “leverage” into concrete negotiation proposals, timelines, or conditionality.
• —Formal diplomatic engagement on Greenland basing access, radar upgrades, and infrastructure permitting involving Denmark/Greenland authorities.
• —Public commitments or disputes over remediation of nuclear waste and decommissioning of legacy radar sites.
• —Defense procurement announcements tied to Arctic surveillance, communications, and land-based radar systems.
• —Shipping/insurance guidance changes for northern routes that reflect perceived security risk.