Zürich’s crack crisis and Serbia’s protest wave: are governments losing control of public safety?

Zürich is facing what one Swiss outlet describes as its worst drug crisis in more than three decades, with crack addiction and related street disorder intensifying in recent weeks. The reporting argues that policymakers are reacting “planlessly” and are again “one step too late,” implying a gap between the speed of drug-market dynamics and the pace of political response. In parallel, Serbia is experiencing its largest protest movement in decades, according to an ECFR analysis. The unrest is traced to a turning point that began in 2024 with the deadly collapse of the Novi Sad railway station canopy, which evolved into a broader crisis of trust in institutions and governance. The common thread is legitimacy under strain: when citizens perceive that authorities cannot prevent preventable disasters or manage public health and security threats, mobilization accelerates. In Zürich, the drug crisis narrative suggests a governance problem—policy design, enforcement, and harm-reduction capacity may be mismatched to the scale and tempo of crack-related harm. In Serbia, the ECFR piece frames protests as a “leaderless movement” driven by deep skepticism toward political parties and the state’s ability to deliver accountability, transparency, and safety. The power dynamic shifts toward street coalitions and civil-society networks, while established parties risk losing agenda-setting power and facing sustained pressure for reforms. Market and economic implications are indirect but potentially material through public-safety costs, policing and health spending, and investor sentiment around governance risk. In Switzerland, a sustained crack crisis can raise near-term costs for municipal services and social programs, and it can also affect local commercial activity in affected neighborhoods through perceived disorder risk. In Serbia, large-scale protests can disrupt transport and urban economic activity, and they can increase the risk premium for sovereign and corporate borrowing if political uncertainty persists. While the articles do not cite specific commodities or FX moves, the likely transmission channels are higher security and healthcare expenditures, potential disruptions to logistics around Novi Sad, and a broader “institutional risk” discount that can weigh on capital flows. What to watch next is whether authorities move from reactive measures to credible, resourced strategies that change outcomes quickly enough to restore trust. For Zürich, key indicators include changes in crack-related harm-reduction capacity, policing/enforcement effectiveness, and measurable reductions in visible street-level disorder. For Serbia, the trigger points are protest escalation or de-escalation, the government’s willingness to deliver accountability for the Novi Sad collapse, and whether parties can offer credible governance reforms rather than symbolic responses. Monitoring should also include signals from civil-society and policy think tanks cited in the ECFR analysis, since they can indicate whether the movement is consolidating around specific demands or fragmenting. If both crises remain unresolved over the coming weeks, the probability of spillover into broader political instability and sustained economic uncertainty rises.

Geopolitical Implications

• 01

  Domestic legitimacy shocks can translate into persistent political instability and regional confidence effects.

• 02

  Leaderless protest dynamics can prolong confrontation and complicate negotiations.

• 03

  Public-safety and public-health crises can become political flashpoints that redirect resources from other priorities.

Key Signals

• —Measurable improvements in harm-reduction and enforcement outcomes in Zürich.
• —Concrete accountability steps in Serbia tied to the Novi Sad canopy collapse, with timelines.
• —Protest trajectory: size, organization, and whether demands consolidate or fragment.
• —Localized disruption indicators around Novi Sad transport nodes.