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78economy

Europe wakes to red heat alerts and cross-border safety bulletins—how far will the climate shock ripple into markets?

On Tuesday, multiple European countries moved into heightened readiness as a deadly heatwave intensified and authorities issued high-level alerts. In Spain, five provinces woke to a red weather alert with temperatures approaching 40°C, while dozens of local councils extinguished San Juan bonfires to reduce wildfire risk. Separately, travelers were warned that high-level bulletins had been issued across France, Spain, Italy, Switzerland, Luxembourg, and the UK, signaling a coordinated approach to transnational risk communication. The UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, used the same moment to press for faster climate action, arguing that fossil-fuel-driven warming is already producing irreversible damage. Geopolitically, the cluster links climate-driven emergency management with cross-border governance and reputational pressure on governments and major industries. Heatwaves and wildfire prevention measures can quickly become political flashpoints—testing public trust, emergency capacity, and the credibility of national adaptation plans—while also forcing coordination across borders when risk messaging and travel advisories converge. The UN’s framing suggests a shift from “mitigation promises” to “implementation under duress,” which can advantage countries and firms that can finance clean-energy transition faster. At the same time, the call for AI companies to disclose environmental impact ties strategic technology sectors to climate accountability, potentially reshaping regulatory expectations and procurement decisions. Overall, the immediate winners are preparedness and clean-energy investment ecosystems; the losers are laggards facing higher insurance, response, and compliance costs. Market and economic implications are likely to concentrate in power, insurance, and logistics, with second-order effects on commodities and currencies through risk premia. Red heat alerts and wildfire suppression can strain electricity demand (cooling) while reducing generation reliability in heat-stressed grids, supporting near-term volatility in European power contracts and raising the cost of grid balancing. Fire risk and emergency spending can lift claims expectations for insurers, pressuring European property and catastrophe reinsurance pricing, while travel advisories may dampen short-term tourism flows and airline load factors. The UN’s emphasis on clean-energy transition and fossil-fuel responsibility reinforces the medium-term bid for renewables, grid infrastructure, and efficiency services, while increasing scrutiny on carbon-intensive supply chains. In FX terms, heightened risk-off during extreme-weather episodes typically strengthens safe havens versus higher-beta currencies, though the direction will depend on how long the heatwave persists. What to watch next is whether the alerts escalate from “weather readiness” to broader infrastructure and public-safety measures, and whether cross-border bulletins expand to additional countries or sectors. Key indicators include the duration of temperature anomalies, wildfire ignition rates, reservoir and river-flow constraints affecting hydropower and cooling water, and grid operator statements on demand peaks and generation outages. For markets, monitor European power volatility, insurance pricing signals, and shipping or aviation disruptions tied to safety advisories. On the policy side, track whether governments accelerate clean-energy permitting, emergency wildfire funding, and mandatory environmental disclosure requirements for high-impact industries like AI and data centers. Escalation triggers would be sustained temperatures above seasonal thresholds for multiple days, rising wildfire containment failures, or evidence of cascading grid instability; de-escalation would come with cooling trends, improved containment, and downgraded travel advisories.

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72security

BlackCore Accused of Election Meddling—Is a Shadow Influence Campaign Spreading Across Europe and the US?

A French disinformation watchdog, Viginum, accused the Israeli tech firm BlackCore of meddling in elections beyond Israel, including France’s local elections in March and alleged interference in New York City and Scotland. The claims, reported on June 12, 2026, also allege BlackCore operated in Angola and Togo, expanding the geographic footprint of the suspected influence effort. A separate report said the same firm targeted US and Scottish elections, framing the activity as political interference rather than conventional cybercrime. The reporting names BlackCore as the central actor and positions France as the key accuser, with the allegations now spreading across European and US political risk discussions. Strategically, the episode matters because it links private-sector “tech” capabilities to state-adjacent influence operations, raising questions about attribution, accountability, and cross-border enforcement. If the allegations are accurate, BlackCore would be functioning as an instrument that can shape electoral narratives in multiple jurisdictions while reducing direct state exposure for the sponsor. France benefits politically by signaling tougher scrutiny of foreign information operations, but it also risks diplomatic friction with Israel and potential blowback if evidence is contested. For the US and the UK (including Scotland), the stakes are domestic trust and the integrity of democratic processes, especially as election interference claims can quickly become partisan weapons. The broader power dynamic is a contest over information sovereignty, where European regulators and security services attempt to constrain influence ecosystems that may be hard to regulate through traditional sanctions or law enforcement. Market and economic implications are indirect but potentially material through risk premia in cybersecurity, political risk insurance, and compliance spending. If election interference allegations intensify, demand could rise for disinformation detection, election security tooling, and incident-response services, supporting segments of the cybersecurity sector. Financial markets may not reprice immediately, but the narrative can affect sentiment toward defense-adjacent contractors and cybersecurity vendors, while increasing volatility in European and US “risk-off” positioning around election cycles. Currency impacts are unlikely from the articles alone, yet broader geopolitical tension can influence EUR/USD and sovereign spreads via uncertainty about cross-border security cooperation. The most plausible near-term market signal is higher scrutiny of vendors and contractors tied to influence operations, which can translate into procurement delays and compliance costs for affected firms. What to watch next is whether Viginum or French authorities provide technical indicators, legal findings, or referrals that enable coordinated action with US and UK election-security bodies. Trigger points include any public attribution updates, arrests or sanctions proposals, and evidence of active campaigns during subsequent electoral milestones in the US and the UK. Another key indicator is whether regulators expand investigations into other “disinformation detection” and influence-related vendors, potentially broadening the compliance perimeter for European institutions. In the near term, escalation risk will hinge on diplomatic responses from Israel and on whether evidence withstands scrutiny in courts or parliamentary inquiries. De-escalation would look like transparent evidence-sharing, joint investigative task forces, and a shift from allegations to verifiable technical attribution.

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72security

Microsoft and telecoms fallout: cybercrime’s “trusted” certificates, AI zero-days, and a Luxembourg network crash—what’s next?

Microsoft says it disrupted a malware-signing-as-a-service operation that abused its Artifact Signing service to generate fraudulent code-signing certificates, enabling ransomware gangs and other cybercriminals to make malicious software appear legitimate. The disruption highlights how “trust” infrastructure—certificate issuance and signing workflows—can be weaponized at scale, turning enterprise security controls into an attack surface. In parallel, reporting on Verizon’s 2026 Data Breach Investigations Report indicates attackers increasingly rely on exploits as the top initial access vector, after failing to find enough usable vulnerabilities in the prior year. Together, these threads suggest a cyber ecosystem shifting from opportunistic vulnerability hunting toward operationalized exploitation and abuse of legitimate tooling. Strategically, the cluster points to a geopolitical dimension of cyber capability: major vendors’ platforms (Microsoft 365 and Azure) are both the battlefield and the supply chain for trust, while telecom infrastructure incidents raise cross-border attribution and escalation risks. The Huawei-linked claim that a zero-day was behind Luxembourg’s entire telecoms network crash last year underscores how small states with dense cross-border connectivity can become high-leverage targets, even when the incident is not publicly acknowledged. If certificate abuse and administrative-feature theft become more common, defenders will face a credibility problem: even signed code and legitimate admin flows may not be sufficient proof of safety. The likely beneficiaries are cybercriminal operators who can reduce friction in deployment and increase persistence, while the losers are enterprises and critical-infrastructure operators that must raise verification costs and incident response readiness. Market and economic implications are indirect but potentially material: Microsoft security posture and customer confidence can influence enterprise spending on identity, endpoint, and cloud security tooling, while exploit-driven breach trends typically raise demand for vulnerability management and detection platforms. For investors, the most sensitive “symbols” are cybersecurity and cloud security vendors exposed to enterprise budgets, such as CrowdStrike (CRWD), Palo Alto Networks (PANW), Zscaler (ZS), and Microsoft (MSFT) itself, where any perceived trust erosion can affect sentiment. On the macro side, higher breach frequency and complexity tend to increase insurance premiums and incident-response costs, pressuring budgets for IT and security operations. While the articles do not quantify price moves, the direction is consistent with elevated risk premia for cyber insurance and security software, especially for organizations running Microsoft 365 and Azure at scale. What to watch next is whether Microsoft provides further technical details on the Artifact Signing abuse chain and whether it issues additional mitigations or detection guidance for customers using code-signing workflows. Verizon’s finding that exploits dominate initial access suggests near-term pressure on patch SLAs, exploit monitoring, and threat-hunting for known exploit paths, particularly in internet-facing services. The Atlantic Council piece about AI-enabled discovery of a “zero-day” implies faster iteration cycles for attackers, so defenders should track indicators of exploit weaponization and public/private vulnerability disclosures. Finally, the Huawei-linked Luxembourg telecoms crash raises a governance question: whether regulators and operators will publish lessons learned, and whether any follow-on incidents occur in similar telecom environments. Trigger points include new advisories tied to the Microsoft signing abuse, spikes in ransomware using fraudulent certificates, and any recurrence of telecom instability in small, highly connected jurisdictions.

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62diplomacy

Kazakhstan Draws a Line on $1.4B Naftogaz–Gazprom Award as EU Courts Fight Over Russian Assets

Kazakhstan’s Justice Minister Erlan Sarsembayev said the country will not enforce a $1.4 billion Naftogaz v. Gazprom arbitration award, arguing that a ruling by the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC) falls outside Kazakhstan’s legal jurisdiction. The decision follows an earlier AIFC determination that had recognized an ICC arbitration outcome in Switzerland tied to the Ukrainian state company’s claim against Gazprom (MOEX: GAZP). In parallel, Russia’s central bank escalated its legal fight in Europe by challenging an EU regulation that finances Ukraine using Russian assets, filing with the General Court of the EU in Luxembourg. Separately, a European court timeline is tightening: the Ninth Arbitration Court of Appeal is set to consider Euroclear’s complaint on June 1 regarding a Moscow Arbitration Court decision ordering the Belgian depository to pay 18.2 trillion rubles in a case brought by the Russian central bank. Strategically, the cluster shows a widening “jurisdiction war” over frozen or monetized Russian assets and over cross-border energy claims. Kazakhstan’s refusal to enforce the AIFC-linked award signals that even friendly or neutral intermediaries may limit the reach of arbitration outcomes when enforcement could carry political and legal costs. For Russia, contesting EU rules and Euroclear liabilities is aimed at slowing or reversing the financial pipeline that supports Ukraine, while for the EU and Ukraine the objective is to preserve the legal basis for using Russian assets despite Russian counter-litigation. The immediate winners are legal actors who can delay enforcement and complicate counterparties’ risk models, while the losers are parties dependent on timely cash realization—especially Ukraine’s financing expectations and Gazprom’s exposure management. The broader power dynamic is that enforcement is becoming as consequential as the underlying merits, with courts in multiple jurisdictions effectively competing to set the practical outcome. Market and economic implications are likely to concentrate in sovereign and quasi-sovereign risk pricing, legal-asset monetization expectations, and energy risk premia rather than in direct commodity flows. The $1.4 billion figure is large enough to matter for settlement calendars and counterparty risk assessments in energy finance, but the bigger market signal is the potential for prolonged uncertainty around Russian-asset utilization in Europe. Instruments sensitive to these themes include European custodial and settlement infrastructure risk perceptions (Euroclear-related counterparties), Russian-linked legal and credit exposures, and broader EUR/USD and EUR-denominated risk premia tied to sanctions enforcement. If Russian litigation succeeds in Luxembourg or if enforcement against custodians is further delayed, the direction of impact would likely be negative for the probability-weighted cash flows supporting Ukraine and mildly supportive for risk hedges tied to Russian asset recovery. Conversely, if EU courts uphold the regulation and Euroclear’s appeal fails, the direction would shift toward firmer monetization expectations, potentially reducing tail-risk spreads for asset-backed financing structures. What to watch next is the June 1 hearing outcome on Euroclear’s appeal, because it can determine whether Moscow’s liability theory gains traction in practice or is further contained. In Luxembourg, the key trigger is how the General Court frames the Russian central bank’s challenge to the EU regulation—whether it grants interim measures, accelerates review, or dismisses the case on jurisdictional grounds. For Kazakhstan, the trigger is whether it offers a clearer legal pathway for arbitration enforcement or maintains a hard refusal that could prompt further Ukrainian or ICC-related pressure. The escalation/de-escalation timeline is therefore bifurcated: near-term procedural developments in Europe (June 1 and subsequent scheduling) versus longer-dated merits and interim-measure decisions in Luxembourg. Executives should monitor court docket updates, any interim relief signals, and changes in enforcement posture by custodians and counterparties that could translate legal uncertainty into market pricing within weeks.

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62diplomacy

Macron courts Ukraine’s allies—and the EU tightens refugee rules as trade diplomacy gets messy

On June 5, 2026, French President Emmanuel Macron invited Ukraine’s allies to attend France’s Bastille Day celebrations in Paris on July 14, framing the move as part of broader European support. The invitation was delivered on the margins of the EU–Western Balkans summit in Montenegro, where Macron used the “Coalition of the Willing” concept to signal coalition-style coordination rather than purely institutional diplomacy. In parallel, EU home affairs ministers showed “strong support” for excluding fighting-age men from the EU’s temporary protection scheme for Ukrainian refugees, according to Swedish Migration Minister Johan Forssell. The same day, an EU transparency watchdog accused the European Commission of maladministration for not preserving a text message from Macron to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen urging a freeze in talks on a major Mercosur trade deal. Strategically, the cluster points to a Europe that is simultaneously hardening its wartime posture and renegotiating internal cohesion. Macron’s outreach to Ukraine’s allies suggests France is trying to keep Ukraine’s external coalition engaged while also positioning Paris as a convening power in European security. The refugee policy debate—especially the idea of excluding men of call-up age—reflects a tension between humanitarian commitments and domestic political pressure to manage labor, security, and mobilization risks. Meanwhile, the Mercosur messaging dispute highlights how trade diplomacy is becoming entangled with national leaders’ influence over EU executive processes, potentially weakening the Commission’s negotiating leverage with Latin American partners. Market and economic implications are likely to be felt through three channels: defense signaling, migration-driven fiscal and labor planning, and trade negotiation risk. Defense-related sentiment could support European defense contractors and logistics providers, as coalition-style engagement tends to reinforce expectations of sustained support to Ukraine; however, the articles do not specify new procurement, so the magnitude is more “sentiment-driven” than “order-driven.” The refugee scheme tightening could affect demand patterns in social services, housing, and local labor markets across EU member states, with second-order effects on wage bargaining and regional public finance. The Mercosur freeze-urging controversy raises uncertainty around EU–Latin America trade timelines, which can pressure risk premia for exporters tied to agricultural and industrial supply chains, and it may also influence currency and rates expectations indirectly via broader EU growth sentiment. What to watch next is whether the EU home affairs ministers convert the “strong support” into formal guidance or legislative amendments for the temporary protection scheme. A key trigger will be how member states define “fighting-age” and how exemptions are handled for medical, caregiving, or protected-status categories, because legal design will determine compliance and litigation risk. On the trade front, the watchdog’s maladministration claim could lead to procedural scrutiny, which may slow or reshape Commission negotiating strategy on Mercosur, especially if national leaders continue to press for pauses. Finally, Macron’s July 14 invitation will be a diplomatic test: attendance by prominent Ukraine-aligned partners would signal durable coalition coordination, while any absences could reveal fractures in how Europe balances security, migration policy, and trade priorities.

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62economy

Europe’s housing pressure cooker: Zurich and Luxembourg top the price charts while Lisbon turns locals into “islands”

A new European property ranking highlights how extreme housing affordability has become, with Switzerland and Luxembourg leading the priciest markets. The report points to Zurich apartment prices exceeding those in Paris by more than 2x, underscoring a widening gap between wages and shelter costs. Separately, a Portuguese-language and German-language coverage focuses on Lisbon’s rental and affordability strain, describing a city where locals are increasingly displaced by expats, digital nomads, and students. The articles frame Lisbon as a stress test for European housing policy, noting that Portugal has used immigration and relocation incentives while Switzerland debates tighter limits. Geopolitically, the cluster is less about borders and more about social cohesion and policy credibility—two variables that increasingly shape domestic stability and cross-border migration politics. Lisbon’s “locals becoming islands” narrative suggests that housing markets are acting as a de facto gatekeeping mechanism, potentially fueling political backlash against foreign inflows and against the perceived failure of regulation. The Swiss comparison matters because it signals a policy divergence within Europe: Switzerland is portrayed as moving toward a cap-style approach, while Portugal is depicted as leaning on incentives that can amplify demand in high-cost neighborhoods. The immediate winners are landlords and high-income buyers, while the losers are renters, young households, and cities trying to preserve affordability without deterring investment. Market and economic implications are direct for European real estate, household consumption, and labor mobility. If Zurich prices are more than double Paris, the risk is that capital continues to concentrate in “safe-haven” property markets, tightening liquidity for first-time buyers and raising the cost of living in Switzerland and Luxembourg relative to peers. In Portugal, the articles imply that rents can rise faster than wages, which typically pressures retail spending, increases commuting burdens, and can shift demand toward longer-term rentals outside central areas. While the articles do not cite specific tickers, the likely market transmission runs through European housing finance, mortgage origination, and property-linked equities and REITs, with higher volatility in regions where affordability is worst. What to watch next is whether policy responses shift from incentives and market tolerance toward supply expansion, rent regulation, or immigration caps that explicitly target demand. The Swiss reference to an “upper limit” debate is a key trigger: if caps tighten, it could cool demand in the most expensive segments, but also redirect flows to other European hubs. For Lisbon, the next indicators should include rental price growth versus wage growth, vacancy rates in central districts, and the pace of short-term rental penetration relative to long-term leases. Escalation would look like accelerating displacement and rising political salience of housing, while de-escalation would be signaled by measurable rent stabilization and improved access for local households within 2–4 quarters.

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62diplomacy

EU to open Ukraine & Moldova accession talks on June 15—will Russia push back?

The European Union has agreed to begin the first stage of accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova on June 15, a move confirmed by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. A formal EU statement on June 12 said all Member States endorsed opening the first accession negotiation cluster for both countries, signaling a coordinated political green light rather than a bilateral, incremental process. The announcement was reinforced by additional reporting that the broader European posture toward Ukraine remains firm even as some Russian cultural figures are gradually reappearing on Western stages. In parallel, Anna Netrebko—an internationally known Russian opera star—was scheduled to perform at the Philharmonie Luxembourg, creating a visible cultural juxtaposition against the backdrop of EU enlargement. Taken together, the cluster points to a high-stakes diplomatic timeline paired with a softer, symbolic public-facing narrative. Strategically, opening the first accession negotiation cluster is a concrete step that deepens EU leverage over reform sequencing, governance standards, and security-related alignment for both Ukraine and Moldova. The power dynamic is twofold: the EU gains a structured channel to bind Kyiv and Chisinau to long-term institutional commitments, while Russia faces a continued erosion of its influence in the EU’s eastern neighborhood. The fact that the EU required unanimity across Member States suggests the bloc is managing internal cohesion carefully, likely balancing enlargement momentum with concerns about war spillovers, corruption risks, and fiscal burdens. The cultural “return” of certain Russian figures—reported as part of a broader shift—may also reflect a European attempt to separate cultural engagement from geopolitical confrontation, potentially complicating Russia’s information strategy and the EU’s messaging discipline. Overall, the beneficiaries are Ukraine and Moldova through accelerated integration pathways, while the likely losers are Russia’s leverage and any expectation that Europe would slow or fragment its enlargement trajectory. Market and economic implications are likely to concentrate in EU policy-linked risk premia and reform-dependent investment flows rather than in immediate commodity shocks. Enlargement negotiations typically affect sovereign risk assessments, banking and infrastructure financing expectations, and the trajectory of EU funds and conditionality for candidate countries; for investors, this can translate into a modest improvement in perceived medium-term credit quality for Ukraine-linked and Moldova-linked projects, though war and implementation risk remain dominant. The EU’s decision also tends to influence European defense and industrial supply chains indirectly, because accession timelines often correlate with continued alignment of standards and procurement frameworks. Currency and rates effects are more indirect: EU-driven integration narratives can support risk appetite toward regional assets, but any escalation in the security environment would quickly overwhelm that effect. In the near term, the most tradable “signals” are likely to be in European political-risk indices, EU enlargement-related headlines that move spreads, and sentiment around EU funding and conditionality. What to watch next is whether the June 15 opening is followed by a rapid, technically detailed negotiation calendar and whether the EU sets clear benchmarks on governance, rule of law, and security cooperation for both candidates. Key indicators include the publication of the negotiation cluster structure, the pace of screening and reforms, and any Member State statements that clarify how unanimity will be maintained as difficult chapters emerge. On the security side, triggers would be any Russian diplomatic retaliation, intensified information operations, or actions aimed at undermining Ukraine’s reform capacity during the early negotiation phase. On the cultural front, the Netrebko performance and similar events will be watched for whether they provoke political backlash inside EU capitals or are used by external actors to argue that sanctions and enlargement are “softening.” The escalation/de-escalation timeline is therefore two-layered: diplomatic momentum from mid-June onward, and security or messaging reactions that could surface within weeks of the formal talks opening.

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62diplomacy

EU and Italy face a triple test: pro-Russia probe, banking power plays, and a Europe-wide cyber breach claim

On June 15, a special committee of the European Parliament moved toward investigating Luxembourger Fernand Kartheiser, described as pro-Russian, for potential breaches of parliamentary rules tied to his links with Russia. The probe is based on a letter first seen by the Kyiv Independent, signaling that EU institutions are willing to escalate internal compliance scrutiny when geopolitical alignment is questioned. In parallel, Italy’s banking sector is in motion: Reuters reporting cited sources that Intesa Sanpaolo reassured Rome in talks involving Generali and the bid for Monte dei Paschi di Siena (Monte Paschi). Separately, the Council of Europe is investigating claims by the ShinyHunters extortion group that it carried out a data breach over the weekend, adding a cyber-security dimension to the same day’s political and institutional turbulence. Strategically, the Kartheiser investigation highlights how Russia-linked influence concerns are being operationalized inside EU governance, not only at borders or in sanctions lists. That matters geopolitically because internal vetting can reshape coalition dynamics, committee access, and the credibility of EU-facing political actors, potentially tightening the space for pro-Russian narratives. The Italian banking angle points to how national political authorities may seek reassurance and influence over consolidation involving legacy institutions, especially when bids intersect with politically sensitive stakeholders like Generali. Meanwhile, the Council of Europe’s probe into ShinyHunters claims matters for European security posture: even unverified extortion claims can accelerate incident response, raise compliance costs, and strain trust in cross-border digital resilience. Market and economic implications are most direct in Italy’s financial sector, where Intesa’s engagement around a Monte Paschi bid and Generali talks can affect expectations for bank consolidation, capital allocation, and deal risk premia. If the bid progresses, investors may reprice Italian bank M&A optionality and governance risk, with potential spillovers into insurers given Generali’s involvement, and into Italian sovereign risk sentiment via perceived stability of major financial institutions. On the cyber side, a credible breach claim targeting European institutions can lift demand for cybersecurity services, incident response, and insurance coverage, while also pressuring IT budgets across public and quasi-public entities. While the articles do not provide explicit commodity or FX moves, the combined governance-and-cyber stress can influence risk appetite for European financials and technology-adjacent security vendors over the short term. What to watch next is whether the European Parliament committee formally opens proceedings against Kartheiser and whether any evidence tied to Russia links is substantiated, as that would determine the political fallout inside EU committees. For Italy, the key trigger is whether Rome’s “reassurance” translates into regulatory or political support for the Monte Paschi bid, or instead into conditions that slow or reshape the transaction. On cyber, the Council of Europe’s investigation outcome—confirmation, scope, and affected systems—will be the decisive indicator for market and institutional response, including whether additional regulators or CERTs are engaged. In the near term, monitor committee schedules, any follow-on statements from EU leadership, and official updates on the ShinyHunters claim; escalation would be signaled by confirmed data exposure, named victims, or coordinated enforcement actions, while de-escalation would come from credible debunking or containment without broader impact.

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